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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MOHAMMED SOLIMAN BARRE,

Petitioner,

v.

Civil Action No. 08-CV-1153(HHK)

GEORGE W. BUSH,
President of the United States, *et al.*,

Respondents.

EXHIBIT LIST FOR MOHAMMED SOLIMAN BARRE, ISN 567

Declaration of [REDACTED] "Intelligence 101" (September 19, 2008)

Declaration of Brigadier General Robert H. Holmes, "Use of Intelligence Products in the Targeting and Operation Cycles in Operation Enduring Freedom" (August 22, 2008)

[REDACTED]
Declaration of [REDACTED] "Names, Aliases, Konyms and Variants" (September 19, 2008)

Declaration of [REDACTED] "Al-Qaida" (September 22, 2008)

Declaration of [REDACTED] "Guesthouses" (September 19, 2008)

Declaration of [REDACTED] "Tora Bora", (September 19, 2008)

Declaration of [REDACTED] "Background Declaration—Terrorist Organization" (September 19, 2008)

Declaration of [REDACTED] "Background Declaration—Terrorist Training Camps" (September 19, 2008)

ISN 567 FD-302 (January 14, 2003)

ISN 567 FD-302 (May 22, 2002)

ISN 567 FD-302 (December 17, 2002)

ISN 567 FM40 (January 3, 2006)

ISN 567 FM40 (August 7, 2003)

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ISN 567 FM40 (December 17, 2002)
ISN 567 FM40 (January 20, 2003)

ISN 760 SIR (February 17, 2006)
ISN 567 SIR (March 15, 2003)
ISN 691 SIR (June 6, 2002)

ISN 567 LHM (January 30, 2004)

IIR 6 034 0181 06
IIR 6 034 0425 05
IIR 6 034 1106 03

[REDACTED]
IIR 6 034 0253 06
[REDACTED]

IIR 6 034 0331 03
IIR 6 034 0367 03
IIR 2 340 6605 02
IIR 6 034 1087 04
IIR 6 034 1264 04
IIR 6 034 0058 06
IIR 2 227 0131 03

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AFGP 2002 600667
AFGP 2002 600587
AFGP 2002 600589
AFGP 2002 600593
AFGP 2002 600639
AFGP 2002 600642
AFGP 2002 600655

Handnote (March 1, 2002)
Knowledgeability Brief (May 12, 2002)

Executive Order (September 23, 2001) "Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions
With Persons Who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism"

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Defense Intelligence Agency

Background Declaration – Intelligence 101

Joint Intelligence Task Force – Combating Terrorism

S-633-08/JTI-3A

19 September 2008

~~(S)~~ The Defense Intelligence Agency produced the following document for the Department of Defense Office of the General Counsel to utilize in federal court litigation.

~~(S)~~ 3 [REDACTED] pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, hereby declare under penalty of perjury that the following is true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.

~~(S)~~ 3 [REDACTED]
3 [REDACTED]

~~(S)~~ Intelligence

~~(S)~~ Intelligence is information essential to the security of the United States and U.S. interests, especially information that is not easily, readily, or publicly known. This information is collected in a variety of ways by different members of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC). The type of intelligence gathered is identified by the method in which it was collected. The five main types of intelligence are:

- ~~(S)~~ HUMINT- Human Intelligence, information derived from a person(s)
- ~~(S)~~ SIGINT- Signals Intelligence, information derived from foreign electromagnetic signals transmitted for the purposes of communication
- ~~(S)~~ IMINT- Imagery Intelligence, information derived from photographs and other types of imagery.
- ~~(S)~~ MASINT- Measure and Signatures Intelligence, information derived from sensors.

Derived from Multiple Sources
Declassify on: SR

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- ~~(U)~~ OSINT- Open Source Intelligence, information that is derived from public sources such as news media.

~~(U)~~ Intelligence gathered using these methods is classified to protect the sources and methods used by the IC. The level of classification depends on how sensitive the information is and the impact the release of the information would have to U.S. National Security.

- ~~(U)~~ Confidential- Release of Confidential information could reasonably be expected to cause *damage* to U.S. National Security
- ~~(U)~~ Secret- Release of Secret information could reasonably be expected to cause *serious damage* to U.S. National Security
- ~~(U)~~ Top Secret- Release of Top Secret information could reasonably be expected to cause *exceptionally grave damage* to U.S. National Security.

~~(U)~~ In addition to these classifications, intelligence may be further restricted with a Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) caveat. In order to gain access to SCI material, a person must be "read-on" to the program that sponsors the collection of that material, reading a description of the uniquely sensitive nature of the protected information and signing a commitment to be held accountable for the program's security. SCI information is dependent on specific methods of collection; therefore, release of that information would compromise U.S. intelligence collection sources and methods.

~~(U)~~ The Intelligence Community (IC)

~~(U)~~ The IC is defined as a federation of executive branch agencies and organizations that work separately and together to conduct intelligence activities necessary for advising foreign relations and protecting the national security of the United States. Such activities include:

- ~~(U)~~ Collection of information needed by the President, the National Security Council and the Secretaries of State and Defense, and other Executive Branch officials for the performance of their duties and responsibilities;
- ~~(U)~~ Production, analysis and dissemination of finished intelligence assessments;
- ~~(U)~~ Collection of information concerning, and the conduct of activities to protect against intelligence activities directed against the U.S. by foreign powers, organizations, and their agents, as well as by international terrorists, narcotics traffickers or other hostile foreign elements;
- ~~(U)~~ Administrative and other support activities within the United States and abroad for the performance of authorized activities; and
- ~~(U)~~ Other intelligence activities as directed by the President.



~~(U)~~ The threats to the United States that the IC works to mitigate take several forms. In addition to military threats that challenged the community in the past, other transnational problems exist: terrorism, proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) materials to

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potentially hostile elements, information infrastructure attacks, narcotics trafficking and foreign intelligence penetrations of sensitive programs.

~~(U)~~ IC Members

~~(U)~~ The IC comprises 17 organizations, led by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). Each member of the IC has its own expertise, mission, and area of responsibility. However, the IC collaborates in various forums, from informal communications, to joint interagency task forces. As of Executive Order 12333, July 2008, the community includes the following organizations:

- ~~(U)~~ The Office of the Director of National Intelligence;
- ~~(U)~~ The Central Intelligence Agency;
- ~~(U)~~ The National Security Agency;
- ~~(U)~~ The Defense Intelligence Agency;
- ~~(U)~~ The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency;
- ~~(U)~~ The National Reconnaissance Office;
- ~~(U)~~ The other offices within the Department of Defense for the collection of specialized national foreign intelligence through reconnaissance programs;
- ~~(U)~~ The intelligence and counterintelligence elements of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps;
- ~~(U)~~ The intelligence elements of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI);
- ~~(U)~~ The Office of National Security Intelligence of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA);
- ~~(U)~~ The Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy;
- ~~(U)~~ The Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State;
- ~~(U)~~ The Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of the Treasury;
- ~~(U)~~ The Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security;
- ~~(U)~~ The intelligence and counterintelligence elements of the Coast Guard; and
- ~~(U)~~ Such other elements of any department or agency as may be designated by the President, or designated jointly by the Director and the head of the department or agency concerned, as an element of the Intelligence Community.

~~(U)~~ Although several offices of federal agencies are members of the IC, the agency itself may not be a member of the IC. For example, the Department of Justice (DoJ) as an entity is not a member of the IC; however, the intelligence elements of the FBI and the DEA, which fall under the DoJ, are members of the Community.

~~(U)~~ The Intelligence Cycle


~~(U)~~ The intelligence cycle drives the day-to-day activities of the IC. It is the process of developing raw information into finished products for use by the President, military, policy

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makers, law enforcement or other decision makers for National Security purposes. There are five steps in the Intelligence Cycle:

- Planning
- Collection
- Processing
- Analysis and Production
- Dissemination



~~(U)~~ **Planning**

~~(U)~~ The planning stage is the process of identifying intelligence gaps or topics of intelligence interest, prioritizing intelligence needs, and assigning the appropriate organization to obtain that intelligence. It is the beginning and the end of the cycle—the beginning because it involves drawing up specific collection requirements and the end because finished intelligence, which supports policy decisions, generates new requirements.

~~(U)~~ The whole process depends on guidance from public officials. Policy makers—the President, his aides, the National Security Council, and other major departments and agencies of government—initiate requests for intelligence. At the national level, the result of the planning process is the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF).

~~(U)~~ **The NIPF**


~~(U)~~ The NIPF is the Director of National Intelligence's guidance to the IC on the national intelligence priorities approved by the President. The NIPF consists of: (1) intelligence topics reviewed by the National Security Council Principals Committee and approved by the President, (2) a process for assigning priorities to countries and non-state actors relevant to the approved intelligence topics, and (3) a matrix showing those priorities. The NIPF matrix reflects customers' priorities for intelligence support and ensures that long-term intelligence issues are addressed.

~~(U)~~ The Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis (DDNI/A), on behalf of the DNI, oversees the process for developing recommendations on national intelligence priorities. DDNI/A updates the NIPF semi-annually in coordination with IC elements, the National Intelligence Council, designated Mission Managers, and the Deputy Directors of National Intelligence for Policy, Plans, and Requirements (DDNI/PPR) and Collection (DDNI/C). Ad hoc adjustments may be made to reflect changes in world events and policy priorities.



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~~(U)~~ **Collection**

~~(U)~~ Once intelligence requirements are assigned to the appropriate organization based on their collection assets and mission, the IC begins, or continues, to gather information to satisfy those requirements. The collection specialties of the IC members are as follows:

- ~~(U)~~ HUMINT- CIA, DIA, Military Services
- ~~(U)~~ SIGINT- NSA, Military Services
- ~~(U)~~ IMINT- NGA, NRO, Military Services
- ~~(U)~~ MASINT- DIA, Military Services
- ~~(U)~~ OSINT- Open Source Center (under ODNI)

~~(U)~~ **Processing**

~~(U)~~ Once intelligence is collected, it is typically processed by analysts at the collecting agency who determine its relevance to existing validated requirements. This involves converting the vast amount of collected information to a form usable by analysts through decryption, language translations, and data reduction. This data or "raw" intelligence reporting is then reported electronically or in printed form to customers and to the all-source analytic organizations throughout the IC.

~~(U)~~ **Analysis and Production**

~~(U)~~ The analysis and production step, which occurs at intelligence production centers throughout the IC, includes integrating, evaluating, and analyzing all available data to determine topics of interest to IC customers. Analysts consider the information's reliability, validity, and relevance to standing requirements. They integrate data from multiple sources into a coherent whole and form judgments about its collective meaning. The result is finished intelligence assessments intended to inform policy makers of the implications of the information. All-source analysis may be performed on topics of long-term interest and broad scope, or topics pertaining to ongoing events of immediate interest to policy makers.

~~(U)~~ **Dissemination**

~~(U)~~ Dissemination is the final step in the intelligence cycle. In this step, finished intelligence is communicated to the intelligence consumer, to include those decision makers whose needs initiated the intelligence requirements. The most highly protected finished intelligence is hand-carried daily to the President and key national security advisers. However, most finished intelligence products are stored in computer data banks that allow consumers to retrieve them electronically as needed. The IC constantly strives to disseminate its products in a manner and form that best suits its consumers. Where necessary, it will tailor support to meet the needs of individual users. The recipients of finished intelligence products then make decisions based on

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the information. These decisions may lead to the levying of more requirements, thus triggering the intelligence cycle.

~~(S)~~ **Intelligence Reports**

~~(S)~~ All-source analysts utilize a variety of "raw" intelligence reports to write finished intelligence (FINTEL) products. Many of these reports are placed into various databases that analysts regularly access. The accessibility of these reports depends on their classification; in some cases, reports may not be available to all analysts in the community. Reports disseminated into the reports databases are referred to as "message traffic." Some examples of reports by the different agencies are listed below.

~~(S)~~ **DoD Human Intelligence Reports**

- ~~(S)~~ **Intelligence Information Report (IIR).** The IIR is the main DoD reporting vehicle for the HUMINT information used by DIA and military services. It is the only report listed here that is broadly available in message traffic. DIA, as the proponent for these reports, has also issued reported numbers to a number of executive branch departments and offices. These include:
 - Department of Commerce
 - Department of Energy
 - Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
 - Department of Justice
 - Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research
 - Department of State, U.S. Aid to International Development
 - Department of the Treasury
 - Drug Enforcement Administration
 - Federal Bureau of Investigation
 - Immigration & Customs Enforcement (ICE), DHS
 - National Infrastructure Protection Center
 - National Reconnaissance Office
 - U.S. Coast Guard
 - U.S. Secret Service
- ~~(S)~~ **Tactical Interrogation Report (TIR).** [REDACTED]
- ~~(S)~~ **Field Intelligence Report (FIR).** [REDACTED]

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- ~~(S//NF)~~ Draft Intelligence Information Report (DIIR). [REDACTED]

- ~~(S//NF)~~ Summary Interrogation Report (SIR). [REDACTED]

~~(U)~~ CIA Intelligence Reports

- ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

- ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

- ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

~~(U)~~ NSA Intelligence Reports

~~(U)~~ NSA intelligence reports are most commonly issued as EGRAMs, electronically transmitted reports that convey only one issue or event. They are distinguished by an alphanumeric serial number. Additional handling instructions may accompany the serial to provide additional safeguards or to protect sensitive, fragile, and/or perishable sources and methods. Access to SIGINT reporting, in addition, requires approval for access to Sensitive Compartmented Information.

~~(U)~~ Law Enforcement Forms

- ~~(U)~~ Field Document (FD 302)- FBI agents fill out this to summarize an interview. This form contains the notes from the interview on the information that is collected. The forms are often used in court as evidence.
- ~~(U)~~ Form 40 (FM40)- The Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF) uses this form to record investigation activity, such as witness interviews, lab results fingerprint analysis, results of modeling, research results and suspect interviews. This form is used to record information relevant to how a crime was committed as well as the logical and factual basis for any deductions about guilt. CITF conducts investigations of war crimes and to determine if any persons captured in the War of Terrorism are responsible. CITF prepares cases according to the Military Commissions Act for trial by a military tribunal for war crimes and/or acts of terrorism.

~~(U)~~ Intelligence Analysis

~~(U)~~ Intelligence analysis is the process of dissecting and compiling ambiguous information to determine a truth. Intelligence analysts undergo rigorous tradecraft training. Analysts use various methods and employ specific analytical tools to assist them in sorting and organizing the

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various pieces of information. Analysts are trained to recognize and mitigate biases, not only in the information presented to them, but their own cognitive biases as well. The DNI issued the Directive for Analyst Standards in 2007, to ensure that all intelligence analysts in the IC use the same standards of excellence, integrity and objectivity in their assessments.

~~(S)~~ **Analysis: Building an Analytic Argument**

1. **Establish a baseline assessment:** What do we know is going on, what do we think is going on, and what do not we know that we need to figure out?
2. **Vet new information for consistency with the baseline.** Is it in the ballpark of the baseline? Does it say the same thing or does it reveal new developments? Does it add new details about something we already know? Does it say something outlandish or contradictory to reports from sources that are more reliable?
3. **Revise your baseline as necessary to accommodate new information.** If there is contradictory reporting of equally good quality, acknowledge this and explore ways it might be reconciled. If there are no good sources or reports with which to establish a reliable baseline, acknowledge the weakness of the reporting and make your best estimate.
4. **Follow-up information gaps as they become apparent.** Learn about and task collection resources as appropriate across the IC to generate new information. Work closely with collectors whenever possible.

~~(S)~~ **Evaluating Sources**

~~(S)~~ Intelligence analysts must consider the source of intelligence while reading intelligence reports. Several factors help determine the credibility of a HUMINT source, most importantly placement and access to the information, and the motivation for reporting. Much like informant reports received by law enforcement official, HUMINT sources are carefully screened and subsequently rated on their reliability, both on the source themselves and the information provided. Intelligence reports include a source line that gives a description of the source and their assessed credibility by the reporting officer. Further, the analyst uses this information in their overall assessment of the intelligence provided and how it relates to other available intelligence on the same problem set.


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- ~~(U)~~ Source's motivation (inform or influence)
- ~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~ Wittingness of the source, and their knowledge that the U.S. government will receive the information provided



~~(U)~~ Intelligence analysts take additional steps to determine source reliability, including:

- ~~(U)~~ Verification of intelligence by other means
 - > Other HUMINT sources
 - > Historical reporting
 - > Other intelligence disciplines (IMINT, SIGINT, MASINT, etc)
 - > Review of captured documents and electronic media
- ~~(U)~~ Collaboration of intelligence from other members of the Community
- ~~(U)~~ In some cases, a HUMINT source may be polygraphed

~~(U)~~ Interrogators are trained to recognize non-verbal cues from the source that will help them determine the credibility of the information provided. Interrogators are also trained to take cultural dynamics to understand the unique psychological issues dealing with sources based on cultural norms. This provides the collectors and interrogators additional insights into deceptive behaviors.

~~(U)~~ SIGINT, and more specifically communications intelligence (COMINT), is derived from the exploitation of cryptographic systems or other protected sources through the application of specific methods or techniques. In general, SIGINT reporting is deemed reliable since the information comes directly from the communicant(s). However, the information may be deliberately misleading if the communicants suspect they are being monitored and deliberately give false information, or they may be deceptive with the individuals they are communicating with, or they may have a history of providing inaccurate information.

~~(U)~~ Before a finished intelligence product is disseminated, it goes through a rigorous coordination process, both in the producing organization and with peers throughout the IC. The coordination process ensures there is a consensus on the assessment, and any credibility issues are addressed.

I have read this declaration and concur with the findings and conclusion.

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Enclosures:

1. Appendix A. ~~(U)~~ Special Regulations and Designations for Terrorists
2. Appendix B. IICT NIP

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3. Appendix C, NIPF CT Priorities Terrorist Support Entities June 2008

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Appendix A. ~~(S)~~ Special Regulations and Designations for Terrorists

~~(U)~~ Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT)

~~(U)~~ Executive Order 13224, empowers the Department of State and the Department of the Treasury to place both groups and individuals on the Specially Designated Global Terrorist list, which defines terrorism as: an activity that 1. involves a violent act or an act dangerous to human life, property, or infrastructure; and 2. appears to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, kidnapping, or hostage taking. This also includes any activity that provides financial, material, or technological support to acts of terrorism or entities designated in or under the Order.

~~(S)~~ Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO)

~~(U)~~ A Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) is a foreign organization designated by the Secretary of State in accordance with section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as amended. FTO designations play a critical role in our fight against terrorism and are an effective means of curtailing support for terrorist activities and pressuring groups to get out of the terrorism business.

~~(U)~~ The Office of the Coordinator for Counter Terrorism in the State Department (S/CT) continually monitors the activities of terrorist groups active around the world to identify potential targets for designation. When reviewing potential targets, S/CT looks at the actual terrorist attacks that a group has carried out and whether that group has engaged in planning and preparations for possible future acts of terrorism or retains the capability and intent to carry out such acts.

~~(U)~~ After a target is identified, S/CT prepares a detailed "administrative record," which is a compilation of information, typically including both classified and open sources information, demonstrating that the statutory criteria for designation have been satisfied. If the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury, decides to make the designation, Congress is notified of the Secretary's intent to designate the organization and given seven days to review the designation, as the INA requires. After the expiration of the seven-day waiting period and in the absence of Congressional action to block the designation, notice of the designation is published in the Federal Register, at which point the designation takes effect. By law, an organization designated as an FTO may seek judicial review of the designation in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit not later than 30 days after the designation is published in the Federal Register.

~~(U)~~ Until recently, the INA provided that FTOs must be re-designated every two years or the designation would lapse. Under the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), however, the re-designation requirement was replaced by certain review and revocation procedures. IRTPA provides that an FTO may file a petition for revocation 2 years after its designation date (or in the case of re-designated FTOs, its most recent re-designation date) or 2 years after the determination date on its most recent petition for revocation. In order to provide a basis for revocation, the petitioning FTO must provide evidence that the circumstances forming the basis for the designation are sufficiently different as to warrant revocation. If no such review has been conducted during a five-year period with respect to a designation, then the

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Secretary of State is required to review the designation to determine whether revocation would be appropriate. In addition, the Secretary of State may at any time revoke a designation upon a finding that the circumstances forming the basis for the designation have changed in such a manner as to warrant revocation, or that the national security of the United States warrants a revocation. The same procedural requirements apply to revocations made by the Secretary of State as apply to designations. A designation may be revoked by an Act of Congress, or set aside by a Court order.

~~(U)~~ **Legal Criteria for Designation**

~~(U)~~ Under Section 219 of the INA, as amended:

- ~~(U)~~ 1. It must be a foreign organization.
- ~~(U)~~ 2. The organization must engage in terrorist activity, as defined in section 212 (a)(3)(B) of the INA (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)),* or terrorism, as defined in section 140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2)),** or retain the capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism.
- ~~(U)~~ 3. The organization's terrorist activity or terrorism must threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national security (national defense, foreign relations, or the economic interests) of the United States.

~~(U)~~ **Legal Ramifications of Designation**

- ~~(U)~~ 1. It is unlawful for a person in the United States or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to knowingly provide "material support or resources" to a designated FTO. (The term "material support or resources" is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1) as "any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel (1 or more individuals who maybe or include oneself), and transportation, except medicine or religious materials." 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(2) provides that for these purposes "the term 'training' means instruction or teaching designed to impart a specific skill, as opposed to general knowledge." 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(3) further provides that for these purposes the term 'expert advice or assistance' means advice or assistance derived from scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge."
- ~~(U)~~ 2. Representatives and members of a designated FTO, if they are aliens, are inadmissible to and, in certain circumstances, removable from the United States (see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182 (a)(3)(B)(i)(IV)-(V), 1227 (a)(1)(A)).
- ~~(U)~~ 3. Any U.S. financial institution that becomes aware that it has possession of or control over funds in which a designated FTO or its agent has an interest must retain possession of or control over the funds and report the funds to the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the U.S. Department of the Treasury.

~~(U)~~ **Other Effects of Designation**

- ~~(U)~~ 1. Supports our efforts to curb terrorism financing and encourages other nations to do the same.

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- ~~(U)~~2. Stigmatizes and isolates designated terrorist organizations internationally.
- ~~(U)~~3. Deters donations or contributions to and economic transactions with named organizations.
- ~~(U)~~4. Heightens public awareness and knowledge of terrorist organizations.
- ~~(U)~~5. Signals to other governments our concern about named organizations.

~~(U)~~ **Current List of Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations**

1. Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)
2. Abu Sayyaf Group
3. Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade
4. Al-Shabaab
5. Ansar al-Islam
6. Armed Islamic Group (GIA)
7. Asbat al-Ansar
8. Aum Shinrikyo
9. Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)
10. Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army (CPP/NPA)
11. Continuity Irish Republican Army
12. Gama'a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group)
13. HAMAS (Islamic Resistance Movement)
14. Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami/Bangladesh (HUJI-B)
15. Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM)
16. Hizballah (Party of God)
17. Islamic Jihad Group
18. Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
19. Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) (Army of Mohammed)
20. Jemaah Islamiya organization (JI)
21. al-Jihad (Egyptian Islamic Jihad)
22. Kahane Chai (Kach)
23. Kongra-Gel (KKG, formerly Kurdistan Workers' Party, PKK, KADEK)
24. Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LT) (Army of the Righteous)
25. Lushkar i Jhangvi
26. Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
27. Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)

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28. Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM)
29. Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK)
30. National Liberation Army (ELN)
31. Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)
32. Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
33. Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
34. PFLP-General Command (PFLP-GC)
35. al-Qaida (al-Qa'ida)
36. al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (formerly GSPC)
37. Real IRA
38. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
39. Revolutionary Nuclei (formerly ELA)
40. Revolutionary Organization 17 November
41. Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C)
42. Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso, SL)
43. Tanzim Qa'idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (QJBR) (al-Qaida in Iraq) (formerly Jama'at al-Tawhid wa'al-Jihad, JTJ, al-Zarqawi Network)
44. United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)

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Appendix B, Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism NIPF Counterterrorism Priorities,
June 2008

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
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
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
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Appendix C, NIPF CT Priorities Terrorist Support Entities June 2008

~~(S)~~ Priority 1:

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[REDACTED]

~~(S)~~ Priority 2:

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
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~~(S)~~ Priority 3:



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~~(U)~~ Priority 4:



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




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(D) Priority 5:



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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MOHAMMED SOLIMAN BARRE,

Petitioner,

v.

Civil Action No. 08-CV-1153(HHK)

GEORGE W. BUSH,
President of the United States, *et al.*,

Respondents.

Declaration of Brigadier General Robert H. Holmes, "Use of
Intelligence Products in the Targeting and Operation Cycles in
Operation Enduring Freedom" (August 22, 2008)

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Use of Intelligence Products in the Targeting and Operational Cycles
in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) ~~(U//FOUO)~~

I, Robert H. Holmes, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, hereby declare
and say as follows:

1. ~~(S//FOUO)~~ This is in response to the request from the Office of
General Counsel for a declaration for Habeas Corpus litigation
regarding the current procedures used to employ intelligence to
locate and capture persons of interest on the Afghanistan
battlefield. As the Deputy Director of Operations for U.S. Central
Command, I am responsible for overseeing the operations of both
special operations and conventional forces within the U. S. Central
Command (USCENTCOM) area of operations (AOR), to include
Afghanistan. From the initial stages of Operation Enduring Freedom
(OEF), U.S. special operation forces (SOF) have located and
disrupted terrorist networks through the use of intelligence. While
the particular tactics, techniques and procedures have changed over
time, the process under which OEF operators acquire and utilize
battlefield intelligence remains relatively constant.

2. ~~(S//FOUO)~~ General. Intelligence is critical for all military
forces, to include those capturing unlawful enemy combatants in
Afghanistan. Ground commanders in support of Operation Enduring
Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan employ a FIND, FIX, FINISH, EXPLOIT,
and ANALYZE (F3EA) process to target the leadership, supporters and
key nodes of terrorist networks. The F3EA process is driven by
intelligence products of all types, to include Intelligence
Information Reports (IIRs), Telegraph Disseminations (TD)s, FBI
302s, FM 40s and Summary Interrogation Reports (SIRs). Commanders
use multi-source and corroborated intelligence products to provide
the clearest possible picture of the operational environment. This
is critical in the fight against a highly compartmentalized, savvy
and network-based enemy. In this fight we must be able to rapidly
identify members of the network to disrupt and defeat their
operations. Critically, we must then exploit the final results of
that operation to lead us to the next individual inside the network
before the network can react and adjust its form to become invisible
again. The following explains how intelligence is used throughout
this continuous cycle to drive operations and ensure we are removing
the enemy from the battlefield with the highest degree of accuracy
possible.

Classified By: MG Scaparotti, USCENTCOM J3
Reason: 1.4 (a)
Declassify On: 22 Aug 2018

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3. ~~(S//NF)~~ Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze (F3EA). The F3EA targeting cycle was developed in order to rapidly operationalize intelligence products. This rapid integration of intelligence products enables the maneuver commander to get inside the enemy's decision making cycle and disassemble the network. Below is a description of each phase of the process and the types of intelligence products used to drive operations:

a. ~~(S//NF)~~ Find. During this stage information from all intelligence disciplines is analyzed to identify an initial vulnerable node or individual. These vulnerable nodes (e.g. a safe house, meeting location, or a courier drop) and individuals (e.g. leaders, financiers, cutouts and religious advisors) are identified through methods such as a Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) developmental reporting (i.e. an individual(s) identified using a particular communications device), a report provided by a walk-in or casual Human Intelligence source, a significant location identified during Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) surveys; or more complex operations such as information resulting from deliberate intelligence interrogations, or the technical exploitation of a piece of equipment. Once identified the individual/node is then verified. Ideally this is done through a second intelligence discipline or a second independent unassociated source. While verification and validation is ongoing, the cycle moves into the second phase.

b. ~~(S//NF)~~ Fix. This phase begins immediately after identification of a valid potential target. During the fix phase, available intelligence assets are brought to bear against the target in order to develop a pattern of life and identify points of vulnerability where the target can be trapped for the next phase: finish. Ideally, this is a multi-asset layered process involving manned and unmanned full motion video and [REDACTED] clandestine and overt HUMINT sources and multi-spectral GEOINT products. These products are analyzed and a series of named areas of interest (NAI) are developed. Now additional collection is dedicated to further refine and validate the targets' presence and indicators of the targets' presence in a given NAI. This phase of the cycle culminates with the development of a trigger that enables the commander to make the decision to dedicate forces to one of the NAIs now renamed to an objective on which the target can be found. This trigger could be as simple as watching an individual move into a building, [REDACTED], a technical device, or even a HUMINT source that confirms the location of the target.

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c. ~~(S//NF)~~ Finish. This phase is the combat operation to detain, neutralize or disrupt the target individual/node or seize the target location. Intelligence support during this phase centers around guiding the combat force to the objective and positively identifying the target individual or location. These intelligence products consist of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] HUMINT sources to guide forces to the objective and to positively identify the target individuals; full motion video support from airborne platforms to guide in forces and maintain situational awareness and early warning of outside threats; and the collection of material of intelligence value from the objective (sensitive site exploitation or SSE).

d. ~~(S//NF)~~ Exploit. This phase is the extraction of all usable information from the target individual, his personal belongings and the target location. All material removed from the target location during SSE is subjected to technical exploitation (in-depth analysis) and translation to collect information of intelligence value. Additionally, the target individual and all associated individuals detained from the objective are questioned to collect intelligence information about the enemy network and future operations. During this process great care is taken to rapidly identify individuals who are not associated with the enemy network and release them. As information is developed during this phase, it is pushed into the analysis occurring in the next phase, which may in turn direct further refinement of the exploitation of the target individuals or the material seized from the objective, thus creating a cycle of exploitation and analysis until a clearer picture of the enemy network is obtained.

e. ~~(S//NF)~~ Analyze. During this phase all the information extracted in the Exploit phase is compared to what was developed in the Find and Fix phases as well as to other related targets along the line of operations to identify the next set of key vulnerable individuals and nodes. This confirms or denies the information that led us to a given objective and shapes our picture of the enemy network. As new vulnerable nodes and target individuals are identified they return to the Find phase and the process begins again. This phase culminates with a new assessment of the enemy network.

4. ~~(S//NF)~~ Unlawful Enemy Combatant Status Determinations. The intelligence products developed and validated during the F3EA process form the foundation upon which commanders make

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determinations of the actual involvement of a target individual in the enemy network and therefore ultimately lead to targeting decisions. Intelligence products and physical evidence from the objective are useful tools with which to determine a detainee's status as an unlawful enemy combatant, and, when subjected to thorough review and analysis by the commanders making the actual determination, generally form the factual basis for that legal determination.

5. ~~(S//FOUO)~~ Intelligence and information produced through this F3EA process are also fed into the broader intelligence analytical cycle, which combines this data with existing information and intelligence to further task out for additional intelligence operations. The information or intelligence derived from both the analytical cycle and the operational cycle (F3EA) are disseminated to higher, adjacent and subordinate commanders through existing intelligence systems architecture to assist in developing targets and driving operations.

6. ~~(S//FOUO)~~ Conclusion. The process described above illustrates the ideal with no resource constraints placed upon the process. The practical realities of the battle field often constrain the time and resources available to execute the F3EA cycle; however, the same principles can be applied even with very limited assets to develop the same effect. Additionally, the sensitivity of the target may also drastically reduce the decision making cycle. The F3EA process will never generate a 100% solution; however, the quality and veracity of the intelligence products remain the cornerstone of the ground commander's decision making process and the key to its success.

Signed this 22nd of August, 2008



ROBERT H. HOLMES
Brig Gen, USAF
Deputy Director of Operations

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MOHAMMED SOLIMAN BARRE,

Petitioner,

v.

GEORGE W. BUSH,
President of the United States, *et al.*,

Respondents.

Civil Action No. 08-CV-1153(HHK)

Declaration of ³ [REDACTED] "Names, Aliases, Knyas
and Variants" (September 19, 2008)

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Defense Intelligence Agency

Background Declaration – Names, Aliases, Kunyas and Variants
Defense Intelligence Agency

Joint Intelligence Task Force – Combating Terrorism

S-616-08A/JTA-3B

19 September 2008

The Defense Intelligence Agency produced the following document for the Department of Defense Office of the General Counsel to utilize in federal court litigation.

I, ³ [REDACTED] pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, hereby declare under penalty of perjury that the following is true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.

³ [REDACTED]

~~(S)~~ Worldwide: Using Names, Aliases, Kunyas and Variants

Arab migration and the spread of Islam around the world intermixed with local ethno-linguistic traditions and cultural practices produce regional variations in the way Arabic names are constructed, pronounced and spelled. These variations, along with differences in standards for the transliteration of foreign names by U.S. military, intelligence and law enforcement organizations, present challenges for the collection, reporting, and analysis of intelligence. The lack of a direct correlation between Arabic and Latin alphabets, combined with these complexities, is of particular importance to analysts while in today's Counterterrorism environment. While using aliases and other forms of multiple identities is not unique to these groups, this declaration will limit itself to providing a basic primer on Arabic-related issues to address the detainee population at Guantanamo.

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Derived from: Multiple Sources
Declassify on: Subject to treaty or international agreement

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~~(S)~~ Elements of Arabic Names

~~(S)~~ Traditionally Arabic names are comprised of five elements: ism, kunya, nasab, laqab, and nisba. This naming convention is widely used by Muslim populations and in countries with significant Muslim influence around the world, although varying depending on the country or region.

- ~~(S)~~ **Ism**- The ism is the proper name given at birth. This part of the name is considered the most personal of the elements. In some areas, it is impolite to call an elder by their ism, yet in other areas; it is common to call people by their ism.
- ~~(S)~~ **Kunya**- The kunya is traditionally an honorific, which denotes that the person is either a mother or father, and is constructed using the name of the first-born son or eldest daughter if the person has no sons. The kunya for a man is Abu, meaning father of, plus the name of the first-born; while Umm is used for women, meaning mother of, with the name of the first-born. For example, Abu Ibrahim means father of Ibrahim. Addressing someone by his or her kunya is a sign of respect.
- ~~(S)~~ In addition, there are several nicknames that use an "Abu" construction, that are not true kunyas. Much like the name Jack is used as a nickname for John, many commonly used kunyas are used as nicknames that do not bear direct resemblance to the given name. For example, Abu Sadeq is a nickname for Jafar, and Abu Ali is a nickname for Hassan.
- ~~(S)~~ Insurgents, radicals and terrorists commonly use kunyas as assumed names or pseudonyms. Kunyas used in this manner are often chosen, or given, without regard to the children's names or regard to whether the individual has children. In this case, using the kunya conceals the individual's identity. Further, it is often used as a security, denial and deception measure. The reasons for an insurgent choosing a certain kunya varies widely. It could be the region they are from such as Zarqawi (from Zarqa), Suri (the Syrian), or al-Masri (the Egyptian). It can be derived from the early heroes of Islamic conquest, like Abu Ubaydah, one of three who led expeditions against Byzantium. It can be derived from past historical or Militant Islamist leaders like Abu Azzam, named after the spiritual founder of al-Qaida Abdullah Azzam.
- ~~(S)~~ **Nasab**- The nasab is a pedigree, which denotes the family lineage on the father's side, and can go back several generations. In many countries ibn or bin, is used for males (the son of) and bint for females (the daughter of), while in other countries the names are simply listed in sequence. For example, Hasan ibn Faraj, would mean, Hasan, son of Faraj. Another example using multiple generations would be Hasan ibn Faraj ibn Ahmed ibn Mohammad, meaning Hasan, son of Faraj, who is the son of Ahmed, who is the son of Mohammad. In some regions, that same name may appear as Hasan Faraj Ahmed. A true name usually consists of the ism, nasab and the nisba.

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- ~~(S)~~ **Laqab**- The laqab is a combination of words that describe some religious or admirable quality of the person and is used as a secondary name. In some cases, it is used in place of the ism. A common laqab includes one of the 99 names of God and "Abd." or servant of, for example, Abd al Rahman, or servant of the Merciful. There is no such name as "Abdul" in Arabic, even though we commonly see this in English. This is a mis-translation of "Abd." which is followed by the article "al." Laqab can also connote a person's profession like Samir al-Haddad, which means Samir whose family members at one time were blacksmiths. Another popular laqab of course is Hajj or Haji, meaning the person has made their pilgrimage to Mecca, like Hajj Amin al-Hussein.
- ~~(S)~~ **Nisba**- The nisba is another secondary name that describes the occupation, descent, tribe or residence of the person. It can be used in combination with any of the above elements, but will always be the last part of the name. For example, Mohammad al Masri, means Mohammad from Egypt, or using several elements, Mohammad al Husayn ibn Harun al Qabtani means Mohammad the beautiful, son of Aaron, from the Qabtani tribe. The nisba can tell you much of the persons ancestry and geographic origins, for instance al-Zawahiri although from Egypt, comes from the Zawahir clan of the Hejaz region of Saudi Arabia. Ayman al-Zawahiri attempts to bolster his Arab lineage by making these connections.
- ~~(S)~~ The following example uses a title and all five elements of the naming convention: Mullah Mohammad Abu Nasar Abd al Rahman, bin Ibrahim bin Hasan al Makki; Mullah (title) Mohammad (ism) Abu Nasar (kunya) Abd al Rahman (laqab) bin Ibrahim bin Hasan (nasab, 2 generations) al Makki (nisba). This name would translate to the teacher Mohammad, father of Nasar, servant of the Merciful, son of Ibrahim, grandson of Hasan, from Mecca.

~~(S)~~ Spelling Variants

~~(S)~~ Because Arabic and English have several letters representing sounds that do not correspond directly, several letters or letter combinations are used interchangeably to represent the same sound. This often generates multiple English spellings representing the same word or name in Arabic. Other differences in practice, such as whether to use double or single consonants to express a single sound, further increase variation. It is common to see intelligence reports referencing an individual with several different name spellings. Although, most organizations have established naming standards for common names, this is not consistent throughout the Intelligence Community (IC) and has changed over time.

- ~~(S)~~ Other spelling variables include capitalization, and the use or non-use of dashes, apostrophes and spaces. In some cases, apostrophes replace a letters that do not translate into English, such as the Arabic letter "ayn," which has a distinct sound not used in English. For example, the name Mohammad has over 20 variations and alternate spellings of al-Qaida include al Qaida, al Qa'ida, and al-Qaeda.
- ~~(S)~~ Some commonly interchanged letters include:
 - K, KH, GH, and Q such as: Kandahar, Khadahar, Ghandahar or Qandahar

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- O and U, such as: Mohammad or Muhammad
- A and E, such as: Ahmad, Ahmed
- OO and U, such as: Noor, or Nur
- ~~(U)~~ Some commonly interchanged words and spellings include:
 - Al, Ul and Ur, as in: Mohammad al Rahman, Mohanmad ul Rahman or Mohammad ur Rahman
 - ul Din, and Uddin, as in: Nasar ul Din, or Nasaruddin
 - Abd Ul and Abdul, as in: Abd ul Rahman or Abdul Rahamn

~~(S)~~ Various titles may be added to the beginning of the name, similar to titles used in Western traditions. Although these specific titles are more common in the Arab world, similar titles are used in Afghanistan or Pakistan, from where many fighters are recruited.

- Mullah- Religious leader
- Imam- Religious leader (as in clergy)
- Hajji- Someone who went on a pilgrimage to Mecca
- Shaykh- Title of high respect, usually a leader of some kind (tribal, etc)
- Qari- Someone who can recite the Quran with a specific rhythm
- Qazi/Qadi- Lawyer or judge (on Sharia)
- Ustad- teacher or professor
- Talib- student (Afghan)
- Malim, or Malauwi – religious leader (Afghani)
- Akhund- lawyer (Afghan)

~~(S)~~ The challenges of spelling and translating the use of Arab and Muslim influenced names is further complicated for individuals originating from countries with conventions based in other cultural traditions, especially when combined with significant differences in pronunciation as well as the use of other local languages and alphabets.

~~(S)~~ The source of the reporting can also have a significant impact on how names are spelled. Sources may have a regional dialect, which may complicate the transliteration of the name phonetically, or misunderstanding the name completely. Some reporting originates from foreign sources using different letters to represent Arabic sounds. For example, in Spanish, the "h" is often substituted with "j," thus Mohammad would be spelled "Mojammad." In French North Africa, Sherief is Cherief.

~~(S)~~ Aliases

~~(S)~~ Aliases can take multiple forms, from part of a true name, to a something completely unrelated to the true name. Like a nickname, some aliases are descriptive of physical traits, such as Nasar al Tawil (Nasar the Tall). Aliases can also be just a single word, such as Tareq. Terrorists do use multiple aliases, often changing them in different locations. Nicknames also provide a degree of "cover" or operational security. In addition to theses aliases, many individuals will use "call signs" for security purposes. A call sign is simply another name that is

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only used during indirect communication. These call signs may change depending on with whom one is communicating, or where they are located.

~~(S//NF)~~



~~(U)~~ Confidence Measures for Identification

~~(U)~~ Intelligence analysts consider all of these factors when making assessments about a specific individual or group. The biggest asset to an analyst is an understanding of the complexities of this particular problem set. Through training, experience, and drawing on the expertise of senior analysts, subject matter experts and linguists at their disposal, analysts learn the many variables they need to take into account. Analysts use many tools and processes to make confident assessments, some of these include:

- ~~(U)~~ Database programs generally include features allowing the user to search on variants to account for different transliterations or reporting conventions. These tools may include wildcard or pattern matching searches, fuzzy word searches, and phonetic matching algorithms. In addition, some databases have macros, which employ a list of name variants based on historical search results. Analysts then use additional known details and other reporting to make confident assessments.
- ~~(U)~~ Through research and analysis of multiple reporting sources, analysts are often able to determine the various names used. Corroboration and collaboration within the IC helps analysts confirm identities.
- ~~(U)~~ Documents and media recovered from the detainee at the time of detention, and from other sources can help confirm identifications and/or provide further avenues of assessment. Some detainees have forged documents, such as fake passports, that allow analysts to determine alternative identities of a detainee.

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- ~~(U)~~ Photographs, taken during the detainee's in-processing and those captured with the detainee, provide an additional resource to determine identity. Analysts show these photos to multiple sources in order to get a consensus on the individual(s) in the photograph. The photo identifications (PID) can verify the identity of the detainee and his associates, as well as validate suspected relationships.

~~(U)~~ Conclusion

~~(U)~~ Detainees often use aliases and cover stories to hide their actual activities; however, it is difficult to maintain these cover stories over time. Interrogators note any changes in details in the story, which occur when the topic is reviewed multiple times over a significant time period. Analysts compare these stories against other detainee reporting as well as other sources of intelligence to find inconsistencies and vulnerabilities in the cover story, develop further lines of questioning, as well as to corroborate the reliability and validity of truthful information. The IC mitigates the challenges that foreign language and cultural practices cause in this complex environment. Through advice provided by foreign area specialists, experience, education, and specialized tools, analysts are able to identify—with confidence—persons of interest or concern, including detainees.

I have read this declaration and concur with the findings and conclusion.

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APPENDIX A

Common Country and Tribal Names

Arabic Geographic Adjectives in Names and Equivalents	
Al-Adani	From Aden, Yemen
Al-Afriqi, al-Afriki	The African
Al-Ajami (actually al-'Ajami)	Literally "the foreigner" but almost always pertains to Persians (Iranian, but it could also apply to any Persian speaker—Iranian, Tajik, or Dari-speaking Afghan).
Al-Ajnabi, al-Agnabi	The Foreigner (i.e., not from "here", or "not one of us." NOTE: If "Agnabi" the "g" may imply an Egyptian context.) Al Ajnabi is unlikely to be part of a terrorist nom de guerre, but may be considered an indication that the person so named is considered a "foreigner" or "an outsider" by those using the term.
Al-Almani	The German
Al-Amriki	The American
Al-Andalusi	From Andalusia (southern Spain)
Al-Anfirsi	The man from Antwerp
Al-Ansari	Literally meaning "the supporter" and originally referring to persons in Medina who aided the Prophet Muhammad, al Ansari as now used among jihadists typically means "local jihadist"—as opposed to al-Muhajir, which means "foreign fighter."
Al-Arjantini	The Argentinean
Al-Armini	The Armenian
Al-Asiri (actually al-'Asiri)	From southwest Saudi Arabia
Al-Ayrlandi, al-Irlandi	The Irishman
Al-Badawi	The Bedouin
Al-Baljiki, al-Biljiki, al-Balgiki	The Belgian
Al-Banghali	The man from Bangladesh
Al-Banghladishi	The man from Bangladesh
Al-Baritani, al-Britani	The Brit

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Al-Bedoui	The Bedouin
Al-Brazili	The Brazilian
Al-Britani, al-Baritani.	The Brit
Al-Burtughali	The Portuguese
Al-Danmarki	The Dane
Al-Emirati, al-Imarati	The man from the United Arab Emirates
Al-Englizi, al-Inklizi, al-Ingilizi, al-Injalizi	The Englishman
Al-Faransi, al-Faransawi	The Frenchman
Al-Farsi, al-Farisi	The Persian, the Iranian
Al-Fasi	From Fez, Morocco
Al-Filastini	The Palestinian
Al-Filibini	The Filipino (from the Philippines)
Al-Fiyatnami	The Vietnamese
Al-Ghani	The Ghanaian
Al-Gharbi	The Westerner
Al-Hadrami	From the Hadramat region of Yemen
Al-Halabi	From Aleppo, Syria
Al-Hijazu	From western Saudi Arabia
Al-Hindi	The Indian
Al-Hulandi	The Hollander, from The Netherlands
Al-Ifranji, al-Ifrangi	The European
Al-Ighriqi	The Greek
Al-Ilji (actually al- 'Ilji)	Pejorative Iraqi slang for a Westerner
Al-Imarati, al-Emirati	The man from the United Arab Emirates
Al-Injalizi, al-Ingilizi, al-Englizi, al-Inklizi	The Englishman
Al-Inklizi, al-Injalizi.	The Englishman

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al-Inglizi, al-Englizi	
Al-Irani	The Iranian
Al-Iraqi	The Iraqi
Al-Irlandi, al-Ayrlandi	The Irishman
Al-Isbani	The Spaniard
Al-Iskutlandi	The Scot
Al-Islandi	The Icelander
Al-Isra'ili	The Israeli
Al-Janubi	The Southerner
Al-Jawfi	From the Jauf region of Yemen or Saudi Arabia
Al-Jazairi	The Algerian
Al-Kamiruni	From the Cameroons
Al-Kanadi	The Canadian
Al-Karibi	From the Caribbean
Al-Kashmiri	From Kashmir
Al-Khaliji	From the (Persian) Gulf
Al-Khawaga, al-Khawaji, al-Khawagi.	Literally meaning "Sir," or "Mister" (used especially for Christians and Westerners, with or without the name of the person so addressed), khawaga/khawaji has a street slang meaning, especially in Egypt, similar to calling someone a "gringo." "Al-Khawaja" is unlikely to be part of a terrorist nomme-de-guerre, but can be considered a likely indication the reference is to a Christian or Westerner considered to be "foreign" or "an outsider" to those using the term.
Al-Kini	The Kenyan
Al-Kubawi	The Cuban
Al-Kuri	The Korean
Al-Kuwayti	The Kuwaiti
Al-Libi	The Libyan
Al-Libiri	The Liberian
Al-Lubnani	The Lebanese

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Al-Madani	From Medina, Saudi Arabia
Al-Maghribi	The Moroccan
Al-Majari, al-Magari	The Hungarian
Al-Makkawi, al-Makki	From Mecca, Saudi Arabia
Al-Masri, al-Misri	The Egyptian
Al-Miksiki	The Mexican
Al-Muhajir	Literally "the emigrant" and originally referring to a person who fled from Mecca to Medina with the Prophet Muhammad, al Muhajir as now used among jihadists typically means "foreign fighter."
Al-Muritani/Mauritani	From Mauritania
Al-Nablusi	From Nablus, in the West Bank, Palestine
Al-Najdi	From central Saudi Arabia
Al-Nasibi	A pejorative for Sunnis used by Shi'a
Al-Nimsawi	The Austrian
Al-Nubi	The Nubian (from area near border between Egypt and Sudan)
Al-Nurwaji	The Norwegian
Al-Parsi, al-Farsi	The Persian, the Iranian
Al-Qamari	From the Comoros Islands
Al-Qubrusi	The Cypriot; from Cyprus
Al-Qudsi	From Jerusalem
Al-Rafidhi	A pejorative for Shi'a used by Sunnis that literally means "rejectionist"
Al-Romani	The Romanian
Al-Russi	The Russian
Al-Sa'idi	From Upper Egypt (i.e., the upland area of southern Egypt)
Al-Safawi	Pejorative for Persians (typically today meaning Iranian, but it could apply to any Persian-speaker—Iranian, Tajik, or Dari-speaking Afghan).
Al-Samarra'i	From Samarra, Iraq

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Al-Saudi	The Saudi
Al-Shami	The Syrian, or from Damascus; the Northerner (esp. when North Yemen)
Al-Sharqi, al-Sharuqi	The Easterner
Al-Shili	The Chilean
Al-Shimali	The Northerner
Al-Shishani	The Chechen
Al-Sini, al-Sinani	The Chinese
Al-Sinighali	The Senegalese
Al-Skutlandi	The Scot
Al-Sudani	The Sudanese
Al-Sumali	The Somali
Al-Suri	The Syrian
Al-Suwidi	The Swede
Al-Suwisri	From Switzerland, the Swiss
Al-Ta'ifi	From Ta'if, Saudi Arabia
Al-Tabuki	From Tabuk, Saudi Arabia
Al-Tanzani	The Tanzanian
Al-Trabulsi, al-Trabelsi, al-Tarabulsi	From Tripoli, either Libya or Lebanon
Al-Trinidadadi	The Trinidadian
Al-Tshiki	The Czech
Al-Tunsi, al-Tunisi	The Tunisian
Al-Turki	The Turk
Al-Umani (actually al-'Umani)	The Omani
Al-Urduni	The Jordanian
Al-Urubi	The European
Al-Uzbiki, al-Uzbeki	The Uzbek
Al-Yabani	The Japanese

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Al-Yamani	The Yemeni
Al-Yunani	The Greek

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MOHAMMED SOLIMAN BARRE,

Petitioner,

v.

GEORGE W. BUSH,
President of the United States, *et al.*,

Respondents.

Civil Action No. 08-CV-1153(HHK)

Declaration of ³ [REDACTED] "Al-Qaida" (September 22, 2008)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



Defense Intelligence Agency

Background Declaration – Al-Qaida

Joint Intelligence Task Force – Combating Terrorism

S-648-08/JTA-5

22 September 2008

~~(S)~~ The Defense Intelligence Agency produced the following document for the Department of Defense Office of the General Counsel to utilize in federal court litigation.

~~(S)~~ 1. ³ [REDACTED] pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, hereby declare under penalty of perjury that the following is true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.

~~(S)~~ 3
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~~(S)~~ Al-Qaida Background Declaration

~~(S)~~ In 1988, Usama bin Ladin established al-Qaida in secret to unite Arabs who fought against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, and the organization helped finance, recruit, transport, and train Sunni Islamic extremists for the Afghan resistance. Since al-Qaida's founding, bin Ladin's overall goal has been re-establishing the Islamic Caliphate, unified by a common militant-Salafist ideology rooted in a violent rejection of apostasy and characterized by fervent opposition to Western influence in traditionally Islamic countries. Al-Qaida still seeks to expel U.S. and Western influence from Muslim lands, defeat existing and burgeoning apostate regimes, unite the Ummah and garner Muslim popular support, and continues attempting to carry out future attacks against the United States and its worldwide interests. Al-Qaida merged with the Egyptian Islamic Jihad in 2001 and the Group for Salafist Preaching and Combat (GSPC) in 2006. The merger with GSPC resulted in the creation of "al-Qaida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb." Al-Qaida also announced a merger with the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group in late 2007.

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~


Further, al-Qaida in Iraq is considered a component of the larger al-Qaida, not a separate entity. Overall, al-Qaida serves as an umbrella organization for a worldwide associated movement that includes many Sunni Islamic militant groups.

~~(S)~~ Al-Qaida has several thousand members and associates. The associates, although they may not pledge allegiance to al-Qaida, support its ideology and methods and are referred to as the al-Qaida-associated movement or al-Qaida affiliates. Al-Qaida remains a loose global network, broadly defined by its strategic objective of re-establishing the pan-Islamic Caliphate, unified by a militant-Salafist ideology rooted in a vehement rejection of perceived Islamic apostasy and characterized by violent opposition to Western influence in traditionally Islamic countries. While many may view this goal as aspirational rather than realistic, bin Ladin and his supporters believe it is attainable. Since his 1998 fatwa issued under the World Islamic Front, bin Ladin has urged Muslims and directed al-Qaida to attack the United States and its allies wherever possible. However, bin Ladin has taken a more pragmatic near-term approach to apostate regimes and Islamic sects, allowing strategic interests to dictate al-Qaida's policies rather than ideological compulsion. Ayman al-Zawahiri articulated al-Qaida's contemporary strategy in his July 2005 letter to the now-deceased emir of al-Qaida in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Al-Zawahiri framed peripheral battles in Afghanistan and elsewhere as the vanguard for ultimately establishing an Islamic state in the Levant, Egypt and neighboring states in the Arabian Peninsula and Iraq.

~~(S)~~ Al-Qaida leadership is best analyzed from a functional perspective. Duties often overlap and individuals can be assigned to several functions by matching skill sets, contacts, and other resources with the present needs of the network. Al-Qaida's structure on multiple levels includes an overall emir-leader, a spiritual wing, multiple shura councils, leaders for interdependent functional arms (i.e. media, finance, logistics, etc.), and regional emirs or mid-level operatives who are given control and responsibility for specific areas of operation. Al-Qaida's leadership core is largely, but not solely, Egyptian, and functions around personal relationships and historical connections, many of which were formed during the anti-Soviet jihad. Much of al-Qaida's leadership is well educated, has some form of prior military service in their home country, and prior jihad experience in Afghanistan or elsewhere.

~~(S)~~ Usama bin Ladin (Saudi), as the overall emir for all of al-Qaida, holds supreme executive decision-making authority. Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri (Egyptian) is his second-in-command and likely his most trusted strategic advisor. While bin Ladin maintains overall control, al-Zawahiri is likely most involved on a day-to-day basis and holds the most responsibility for al-Qaida's basic operation. Despite losing numerous senior leaders because of U.S.-led efforts since 2001, al-Qaida has demonstrated an ability to replenish key operatives, usually by promoting from within or adding external operations responsibilities to a senior figure's existing portfolio. It is assessed al-Qaida will continue relying on a cadre of trusted and experienced lieutenants to develop and advance Homeland attack plots from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) safe haven.

~~(S)~~
[REDACTED]



(S) Al-Qaida's most notable terrorist attacks against the United States and the West are the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania; the October 2000 attack on USS COLE in Aden, Yemen; the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks on the New York World Trade Center and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C.; and the July 2005 attacks against the London transportation system.

(S) [REDACTED] Al-Qaida's activities, successes, and ability to generate worldwide press coverage have turned it into a primary recruiter for the global, Sunni militant movement. Key to al-Qaida's longevity and effectiveness is its system of augmenting its members and operations with the resources of affiliated groups as well as "self-recruited" cells that operate independently. Most al-Qaida members operating in Afghanistan/Pakistan are based in Pakistan. Because al-Qaida's senior leadership resides within the Afghanistan/Pakistan border region, local support to the group is critical to its operations and thus facilitates the threat it poses to Western interests throughout the world.

(S) [REDACTED] Recruiting for al-Qaida occurs in mosques, Islamic and secular schools, universities, prisons, sports clubs, non-governmental organization projects, and refugee camps. While imams, family members, friends, and jihad veterans are important assets in the recruitment process, al-Qaida reaches a broader pool of potential recruits by disseminating information through audio and video tapes through radio, television, publications, and the Internet. Recruiters exploit an individual's sense of religious duty; ongoing regional conflicts; social alienation and anti-U.S. sentiment; and the attraction of belonging to a jihadist group.

- (S) [REDACTED]

- (S) [REDACTED]

- (S/NF) Personal relationships and face-to-face interaction—which give greater control over the vetting process—remain the preferred modus operandi to recruit terrorist operatives for attacks.

I have read this declaration and concur with the findings and conclusion.

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MOHAMMED SOLIMAN BARRE,

Petitioner,

v.

GEORGE W. BUSH,
President of the United States, *et al.*,

Respondents.

Civil Action No. 08-CV-1153(HHK)

Declaration of ³ [REDACTED] "Guesthouses" (September 19, 2008)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



Defense Intelligence Agency

Background Declaration – Guesthouses

Joint Intelligence Task Force – Combating Terrorism

S-643-08/JTI-3A

19 September 2008

~~(S)~~ The Defense Intelligence Agency produced the following document for the Department of Defense Office of the General Counsel to utilize in federal court litigation.

~~(S)~~ I, ³ [redacted] pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, hereby declare under penalty of perjury that the following is true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.

~~(S)~~ ³ [redacted]

~~(S)~~ Afghanistan/Pakistan Guesthouses

~~(S)~~ Guesthouses in the Afghanistan/Pakistan region provided insurgents and terrorists fixed locations [redacted]

[redacted] served as training camp facilitations hubs, [redacted] stations for frontline fighters associated with al-Qaida and the Taliban. Al-Qaida [redacted] used several guesthouses including the al-Ansar Guesthouse, the al-Nebras Guesthouse, [redacted]

~~(S)~~ Al-Ansar Guesthouse

~~(S)~~ Al-Ansar was a name assigned to multiple suspicious guesthouses in Kabul, Afghanistan; Kandahar, Afghanistan; and Peshawar, Pakistan. However, the majority of references to the al-Ansar guesthouses describe guesthouses in Kabul and Kandahar.

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Derived from Multiple Sources
Declassify on Manual Review

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

- (S//NF) [redacted] Kabul-based al-Ansar Guesthouse. [redacted] recruits used a training camp near Kabul after spending time at the al-Ansar Guesthouse. [redacted]
- (S//NF) [redacted]
- (S//NF) [redacted] the al-Ansar Guesthouse in Peshawar, also known as the Beit al-Ansar. [redacted]

(U) Al-Nebras Guesthouse

(S//NF) The al-Nebras (variant al-Nibras or al-Nabras) Guesthouse was located in Kandahar, Afghanistan. [redacted] foreign fighters were sent to the al-Nebras Guesthouse before attending training at the al-Farooq Training Camp. [redacted]

(S//NF) [redacted]

(S//NF) [redacted] Al-Qaida operative Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi ran the Ashara Guesthouse. [redacted]

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~(S)~~

- ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED] the Haji Habash House [REDACTED] was used as a transition point for individuals going to train at various training camps. [REDACTED]

- ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]

~~(U)~~ Afghanistan: Processing Procedures at Al-Qaida Guesthouses

~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

~~(U)~~ Conclusion

~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

I have read this declaration and concur with the findings and conclusion.

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MOHAMMED SOLIMAN BARRE,

Petitioner,

v.

GEORGE W. BUSH,
President of the United States, *et al.*,

Respondents.

Civil Action No. 08-CV-1153(HHK)

Declaration of ³ [REDACTED] "Tora Bora", (September 19, 2008)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



Defense Intelligence Agency

Tora Bora

Joint Intelligence Task Force – Combating Terrorism

S-635-08/JTI-3A

19 September 2008

~~(U)~~ *The Defense Intelligence Agency produced the following document for the Department of Defense Office of the General Counsel to utilize in federal court litigation.*

~~(U)~~ ³ [REDACTED] pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, hereby declare under penalty of perjury that the following is true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.

~~(U)~~ ³
³
[REDACTED]

~~(U)~~ **Afghanistan: Tora Bora**

~~(U)~~ **Background**

~~(U)~~ Tora Bora is the name of a cave complex situated in the White Mountains of Eastern Afghanistan, which lie at the border of Nangarhar, Afghanistan, and Parachinar, Pakistan. The cave complex was built in the early 1980s to support mujahideen forces battling against the Soviets. Although the caves were formed naturally, they were enhanced with hydroelectric power, and were capable of housing more than one thousand fighters. The corridors, many interconnected and some miles long, were fully stocked with food, water, and ammunition. There are multiple entrances at various levels along the mountainside with some of the corridors exiting into Pakistan. In the 1990s, Usama bin Ladin used the cave complex as his headquarters.

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Derived from: Multiple Sources
Declassify on: Subject to treaty or international agreement

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~(S//NF)~~ In late 2001, after the fall of the Taliban regime, many Taliban and al-Qaida fighters fled Afghanistan, via Tora Bora, en route to Pakistan. By early November 2001, bin Ladin had returned to his old headquarters at Tora Bora along with Ayman al-Zawahiri, other al-Qaida and Taliban leaders, and an estimated one to two thousand fighters. Around this time a small contingent of U.S. and Afghan forces began to infiltrate Tora Bora to trap bin Ladin and his fighters. The Battle of Tora Bora ensued with significant air-strikes on the cave complex. Through the duration of the fighting, which lasted nearly two months, hundreds of al-Qaida and Taliban fighters were killed, several hundred more captured, and an unknown number, along with bin Ladin, escaped.

~~(S)~~ Caves Details

~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

~~(S)~~ Escaping Tora Bora

~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[REDACTED] This assistance coupled with local tribal customs of hospitality to strangers allowed bin Ladin and so many of his fighters to escape.

~~(S//NF)~~ Local Afghan guides helped Arab fighters out of Tora Bora and into Pakistan. Many fighters hid in the caves until a guide was able to reach them and guide them to safety. [REDACTED]

~~(S)~~ Detainees from Tora Bora

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

I have read this declaration and concur with the findings and conclusion.

3 [REDACTED]

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MOHAMMED SOJIMAN BARRE,

Petitioner,

v.

GEORGE W. BUSH,
President of the United States, *et al.*,

Respondents.

Civil Action No. 08-CV-1153(HHK)

Declaration of ³ [REDACTED] "Background Declaration—Terrorist
Organization" (September 19, 2008)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



Defense Intelligence Agency

Background Declaration – Terrorist Organization

Joint Intelligence Task Force – Combating Terrorism

S-637-08/JTI-3A

19 September 2008

~~(U)~~ The Defense Intelligence Agency produced the following document for the Department of Defense Office of the General Counsel to utilize in federal court litigation.

~~(S)~~ ³ [redacted] pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, hereby declare under penalty of perjury that the following is true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.

~~(S)~~ ³ [redacted]
³ [redacted]

~~(U)~~ Al-Wafa Islamic Humanitarian Organization

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Derived from: Multiple Sources
Declassify on: Subject to treaty or international agreement

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~(S)~~ Al-Wafa Leadership and Official Money Movements

~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

- ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

- ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

- ~~(S)~~ When Matrafi needed funds for charitable activities in Afghanistan, he called upon Shaykh al-Rayis in Saudi Arabia. Rayis would then call Abu Ahmed in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) who would transfer funds through a hawala to the Sheer Khan Exchange Office in Kabul. The Sheer Khan Exchange Office was in the Exchange District and was run by an Afghan named Samsour. Matrafi kept the money in a safe in Kabul. The largest transfer was for \$300,000 USD after the U.S. strikes began in October 2001.

[REDACTED]

~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

• ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

• ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

• ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

• ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

• ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]

~~(S)~~ Al-Wafa and Al-Haramain

~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]

~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]

~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]

~~(S)~~ Conclusions

~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

I have read this declaration and concur with the findings and conclusion.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MOHAMMED SOLIMAN BARRE,

Petitioner,

v.

GEORGE W. BUSH,
President of the United States, *et al.*,

Respondents.

Civil Action No. 08-CV-1153(HHK)

Declaration of ³ [REDACTED] "Background Declaration—Terrorist
Training Camps" (September 19, 2008)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN//COMINT//CFR~~



Defense Intelligence Agency

Background Declaration – Terrorist Training Camps

Joint Intelligence Task Force – Combating Terrorism

S-636-08/JTI-3A

19 September 2008

~~(S)~~ The Defense Intelligence Agency produced the following document for the Department of Defense Office of the General Counsel to utilize in federal court litigation.

~~(S)~~ ³ [REDACTED] pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 hereby declare under penalty of perjury that the following is true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.

~~(S)~~ ³
³ [REDACTED]

~~(S)~~ Afghan Training Camps: 1989 - 2001

~~(S)~~ Overview:

~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]

~~(S)~~ Camp Breakdowns

~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]

~~SECRET//NOFORN//COMINT//CFR~~

Derived from: Multiple Sources
Declassify on: Subject to treaty or international agreement

~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

[REDACTED]

~~(U)~~ Al-Qaida Camps

~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]

~~(U)~~ Al-Faruq Training Camps

~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]

- ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]

- ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]

- ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]

- ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]

- ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]

~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED]
- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED]
- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ According to The 9/11 Commission Report at least seven of the 9/11 hijackers who provided "muscle" for the attacks went through a basic training regime at the al-Faruq camp, and one of the pilots, Hani Hanjour, was identified for inclusion in the plot while training at al-Faruq. The Commission concluded this particular camp appears to have been the preferred location for vetting and training the potential muscle hijackers because of its proximity to Usama Bin Ladin and other al-Qaida senior leaders.

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ Mes Aynak

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ Tarnak Farms aka Abu Obeida Training Camp

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED]

- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

[REDACTED]

- ~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

- ~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~(S)~~ Camps Utilized by al-Qaida and Others

~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]

~~(S)~~ Derunta Training Camp Complexes

~~(S)~~ The Derunta training complex, located 15 miles from Jalalabad, Afghanistan, was a set of advanced terrorist training camps offering training in various explosives, poisons, and chemical warfare agents. Coalition forces destroyed the camp in October 2001.

- ~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

- ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]

~~(S)~~ Derunta: Curriculum

~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]

~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

[REDACTED]

• ~~(S//NF)~~

[REDACTED]

• ~~(S//NF)~~

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~(S//NF)~~ Derunta: Students of Abu Khabab al-Masri

[REDACTED]

• ~~(S//NF)~~

[REDACTED]

• ~~(S//NF)~~

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) Suda Training Camp

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[REDACTED]

• ~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

• ~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~ **Khaldan Camp**

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~ While the Khaldan camp was not an al-Qaida facility, Abu Zubaydah had an agreement with bin Ladin to conduct reciprocal recruiting efforts whereby promising trainees at the Khaldan camp that they could join al-Qaida if desired.

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

• ~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

(U) Abu Yahya Camp for the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group

~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

I have read this declaration and concur with the findings and conclusion.

3

~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MOHAMMED SOLIMAN BARRE,

Petitioner,

v.

GEORGE W. BUSH,
President of the United States, *et al.*,

Respondents.

Civil Action No. 08-CV-1153(HHK)

ISN 567 FD-302 (January 14, 2003)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 01/14/2003

On January 14, 2003, MOHAMMED SOLIMAN BARRE, a.k.a. MOHAMMED SULAYMON BARRE, date of birth [REDACTED] 1964, place of birth Burco, Somalia, US980-00567DP was interviewed at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by Task Force Detective [REDACTED]. The interview was conducted in English and Arabic with translation provided by contract linguist [REDACTED]. After explaining the purpose of the interview, BARRE provided the following information:

BARRE used his residence located at Gulshan-E-1QBAL, Block 6, Karachia, Pakistan, as an office for his company Dihad Shill which is a money exchange/transfer business. BARRE admitted the business was not legal in Pakistan, because he did not pay taxes and he did not have the permission of the Pakistan Government to work.

On November 01, 2001, Pakistan authorities arrested BARRE, at his residence/business. BARRE was blindfolded and taken to a jail in Karachi. BARRE was placed in a jail cell and he observed that the other inmates were of Pakistan descent. BARRE was questioned by Pakistan and American authorities about names and phone numbers in his address book specifically [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. BARRE was also questioned about whether or not he was a member of the Al-Wafa organization.

BARRE explained that [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] had contacted BARRE telephonically and requested information concerning sending and receiving money. BARRE did not conduct any money transfers for [REDACTED] or [REDACTED]. BARRE had no knowledge of the Al-Wafa organization and had never heard of the organization until mentioned by the Pakistan authorities.

BARRE stated that his company conducted two money transfers for [REDACTED]. Both transfers were from Karachi, Pakistan to Mogadishu, Somalia. The first transfer was for \$20,000 and the second for \$5,000.

BARRE was in jail for approximately two or three months when a large group of Middle-Eastern males were brought into the jail. Approximately one month later, BARRE along with the group of Middle-Eastern males, were transferred first to Kandahar, Afghanistan, then to Baghrum, Afghanistan and finally to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

01/14/2003 Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

[REDACTED]
Detective [REDACTED]

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-302a (Rev. 10-6-95)
Continuation of FD-302 of

On
Page

[REDACTED]

Mohammed Soliman Barre 01/14/2003 2

BARRE was shown photographs of the Middle-Eastern males he had been incarcerated with in Pakistan and Afghanistan and stated the following:

[REDACTED]

Does not remember subject
Possibly in the detention camp in Kandahar
Observed in the jail in Pakistan

567

[REDACTED]

Identified his own photograph
Does not remember subject
Does not remember subject
Does not remember subject
Observed in the detention camp in Baghram
Does not remember subject
Does not remember subject
Does not remember subject
Does not remember subject
Does not remember subject
Observed in the detention camp in Baghram
Observed in detention camp in Kandahar

BARRE was questioned on whether or not he had contact with other DiHab Shill offices outside of Pakistan. BARRE stated the only other DiHab Shill office that he contacted was the main office located in Hargeysa, Somalia.

BARRE was informed by the International Red Cross that his father-in-law identified as [REDACTED] is also a detainee at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and lodged in Block "A". BARRE stated [REDACTED] did not work for his company DiHab Shill and he knows of no reason why [REDACTED] would be in the camp.

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MOHAMMED SOLIMAN BARRE,

Petitioner,

v.

GEORGE W. BUSH,
President of the United States, *et al.*,

Respondents.

Civil Action No. 08-CV-1153(HHK)

ISN 567 FD-302 (May 22, 2002)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 05/22/2002

MOHAMMED SULAYMON BARRE, ISN US9SO-00567DP, born [REDACTED] 1964, POB Burco, Somalia. Present during the interview was Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) SA [REDACTED] Army Criminal Investigative Division (CID) SA [REDACTED] and DOD Arabic Language Specialist [REDACTED]. BARRE was made aware of the identity of SA [REDACTED]. BARRE was already aware of the identity of SA [REDACTED] and LS [REDACTED]. The majority of the interview was performed in English, with minimal translation from Arabic to English.

BARRE, a Muslim, claims to have been born in Somalia and his family has lived in Somalia for many generations. BARRE speaks English, Italian, Arabic, Somali and some Irdu. BARRE reiterated information from interviews on 05/03/02 and 05/05/02 and added the following information:

BARRE attended the Somali National University at the location between Mogadishu and Afgooye. This location is where the Agriculture Faculty was located. BARRE received his Bachelor of Science degree in Agriculture. BARRE used the mosque inside the University, but did not pray a great deal. On Fridays, BARRE attended the mosque at Lafole University, which was next door to Somali National University. While BARRE was in college, the Somali government, which was primarily ran by the Darod (phonetically spelled) tribe killed forty members of the Isak tribe. BARRE is a member of the Isak tribe. The Isak tribe was fighting against the government, but BARRE never fought with Isak. BARRE does not like fighting.

After graduation in 1989, BARRE started working for a company called LIBSOMA, in 1990. LIBSOMA was a banana partnership between Libya and Somalia. LIBSOMA exported bananas mainly to Italy. BARRE worked at LIBSOMA until the end of 1990. BARRE worked primarily in the fields. After working for LIBSOMA, BARRE was allowed to farm two hectares for free. BARRE farmed this for a period of time and then returned to his family, which lived in northern Somalia, near Burco.

Investigation on 05/21/02 at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

File # [REDACTED] Date dictated 05/22/02

by [REDACTED] (Army CID)

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[REDACTED]

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BARRE worked for his father, [REDACTED] until 1994, selling animals for export. BARRE claims to have never been involved in an armed conflict in Somalia.

BARRE stated that it was a good thing that the United Nations and the United States came into Somalia in 1993. Somalia needed help because there was no government and rival tribes were fighting. BARRE saw on TV when the United States' forces landed in Somalia.

In 1994, life in Somalia started getting back to normal and the fighting among tribes was less. In 1994, BARRE had acquired about \$900 from his father and from the sale of animals from his family's farm. BARRE used about \$700 to purchase a plane ticket from Puntavia Airlines, a Somali private airline. The \$700 fee included the Visa needed to go to India. The Indian Visa was obtained through the Puntavia Airlines, because India has no embassy in Somalia. BARRE flew from Hargeysa, "the northern capital" of Somalia, with a stop over in Dubai, United Arab Emirates and then to Bombay, India. BARRE took a train from Bombay to New Delhi, India. BARRE lied on his Indian Visa application, stating that he was going to India for business purposes.

BARRE lied to obtain his three month Pakistani Visa. BARRE claimed to entering Pakistan because he was invited by Gama'at Tabliakh. Prior to leaving Somalia, BARRE grew out his beard and dressed like a devote Muslim to fit the part of someone going to Gama'at Tabliakh. BARRE did not join Gama'at Tabliakh and had no intentions of joining it. BARRE was in India for about five days.

From New Delhi, BARRE took a train to Lahore, Pakistan and then took a bus to Islamabad, Pakistan. BARRE did not know anyone in Islamabad and had no job waiting for him.

Initially, BARRE stated that he planned on going to Pakistan to register with the "UNCR" as a refugee. Once he was a refugee, there was a possibility that he could go to Europe or to the United States. Once in Islamabad, BARRE registered with the UNCR and he was given money on a regular basis. BARRE registered in his true name with the UNCR.

After being asked what happened to his passport, BARRE stated that he lost it or it was stolen in Rawalpindi, which is next to Islamabad. Initially BARRE stated he unsure when he lost

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[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of Mohammed Sulaymon Barre, On 05/21/02, Page 3

his passport. After repeated questioning, BARRE stated that he lost his passport a few weeks after he was in Islamabad. BARRE reported the lost/stolen passport with the Rawalpindi police at a station called Central Police or near the center of the city. BARRE stated he arrived to Islamabad in about February or March 1994 and also lost his passport in February or March 1994.

BARRE stated the passport was in his "purse", but gestured like it was a wallet. BARRE also had money with his passport. When BARRE stepped off a bus, he realized his passport was missing. BARRE did not turn his passport into any guesthouse or to anyone. Contrary to his initial account, BARRE stated that after the passport was lost, he registered with the UNCR.

When BARRE arrived to Islamabad, he met another Somali from his tribe, named [REDACTED] last name unknown. [REDACTED] was a student at the International Islamic University studying economics. BARRE stayed in [REDACTED] hostel room for about a month. [REDACTED] hostel was near the Faisal Mosque.

Also during the interview, BARRE said he stayed in a hotel in Islamabad for a week. BARRE was not clear if this was [REDACTED] hostel room or another hotel room.

BARRE then met [REDACTED] a Somali and lived with him for the remainder of the time he was in Islamabad. BARRE and [REDACTED] lived in a small building, with their room being underground. This building was in the "Karachi Company Area".

BARRE was in Islamabad for about six to seven months and left at the end of 1994. BARRE is unsure of the month he left. BARRE did not work the entire time in Islamabad and just "talked to people" about going to Europe or the United States. While in Islamabad, BARRE did not go to a particular mosque, because he could not understand the language at the time. BARRE then noted that on Fridays he went to the Faisal Mesjid (mosque) to hear the speech.

BARRE departed Islamabad and went to Karachi, Pakistan because it was a "business city", there were a great deal of Somalis there and he heard he could get a job.

From late 1994 until 1997, BARRE worked independently in Karachi, escorting Somali businessmen around the city. BARRE also

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[REDACTED]

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translated for the Somalis that came to Karachi. BARRE could not name any contacts that could verify this employment.

[REDACTED] is a Somali friend of BARRE that was a student in Karachi. [REDACTED] left Karachi for Islamabad.

[REDACTED] is a Somali friend of BARRE that was a student at Abu Bakr University in Karachi.

[REDACTED] is a medical student who works in the Genah (or General) Hospital [REDACTED] is from the Isak tribe. [REDACTED] went to school at the "Saint Medical University".

[REDACTED] assisted BARRE to get the job of representing DEHABSHIIL in Pakistan. BARRE never met the "owner" of DEHABSHIIL, [REDACTED] or his son, [REDACTED]. BARRE signed a contract describing his responsibilities with DEHABSHIIL. [REDACTED] also signed the contract. BARRE received the DEHABSHIIL position because [REDACTED] trusted [REDACTED].

DEHABSHIIL's central office is in Hargeysa, Somalia. All requests for transfers of money go through the central office. If a large amount of money is being sent to BARRE in Karachi, the money will be wire transferred to the bank account of a Pakistani company called PEARL EXCHANGE (PEARL) in Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE). PEARL's legal business is the exchange of foreign currency. PEARL is also involved in the illegal wire transfer of money. BARRE was unable to open a bank account because he did not have a passport.

Once funds are received in PEARL's UAE bank account. BARRE will go to the PEARL branch in Karachi and pick up the funds. BARRE was unclear if funds are actually transferred from UAE to Karachi or if it is a bookkeeping entry.

The standard commission is five percent, but the larger the dollar amount of the funds transfer, the lower the commission.

BARRE had his Somali friend, [REDACTED] to assist him in running DEHABSHIIL out of Islamabad. [REDACTED] was studying at the International Islamic University in Islamabad. [REDACTED] was paid \$100 a month and worked out of his house, address unknown. [REDACTED] started working in about August 1998 and worked for about one year.

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] was replaced by [REDACTED] [REDACTED] a Somali, studied at Priston (phonetically spelled) University in Islamabad. [REDACTED] worked as the DAHEBSHIIL representative at least until BARRE was arrested.

The first time BARRE heard of the AL WAFI organization was when Pakistani Intelligence asked him about it. Americans that interviewed him in Pakistan also asked him about AL WAFI. During the second day of interviews it was pointed out to him that he had AL WAFI in his records. At a time between June to August 2001, [REDACTED] called BARRE, speaking in Fus-ha (Modern Standard Arabic) Arabic. BARRE was unable to determine the accent of [REDACTED] because he was speaking Fus-ha Arabic. [REDACTED] said he either wanted to send or receive funds and wanted to know about DEHABSHIIL. BARRE gave [REDACTED] the DEHABSHIIL website address. [REDACTED] either called BARRE or BARRE called him three to five times. BARRE never met [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] is a Pakistani, who spoke Fus-ha Arabic called BARRE one or two times inquiring about DEHABSHIIL around June to August 2001. NFI

Sometime around July through August 2001, an individual who identified himself as [REDACTED] wanted to send \$20,000 from Karachi to Mogadishu, Somalia. DAHEBSHIIL's commission was \$600. This was BARRE's largest transaction. BARRE does not remember who he sent the funds to, but it should be in his records that were seized by Pakistani Intelligence. [REDACTED] appeared to be [REDACTED] or [REDACTED]. In a short period later, [REDACTED] transferred an additional \$5,000. BARRE does not know if the \$20,000 or \$5,000 transfers were related to [REDACTED] inquiries.

BARRE's second largest transaction was a \$15,000 transfer from a Somali (name unknown) in Mombasa, Kenya to [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] is between sixty and seventy years old. The transaction occurred in late 1999. [REDACTED] claimed the \$15,000 was for the purchase of rice from Pakistan to be exported to Kenya. BARRE dealt with [REDACTED] once.

Most of the transfers that BARRE dealt with were incoming transfers from the United States and Europe. The fund transfers were primarily coming from Somalis sending money to their family members in Pakistan. Initially, BARRE stated he could not remember any customers names from the United States.